Implicit action primes and inaction primes can directly affect effort in some circumstances. The present research examined if people high in trait self-focused attention were more strongly affected by action and inaction primes. Past work has found that self-focus makes people more likely to encode implicit primes as self-relevant, thus increasing the effects of primes. As a result, we expected that people high in trait self-focus would be more strongly affected when primed with action and inaction concepts. A group of young adults completed a self-paced parity task in which most trials primed words related to action or inaction. Effort was measured as baseline-totask change in the cardiac preejection period (PEP), a measure of sympathetic autonomic influence on the heart. Trait self-focus significantly interacted with the priming manipulation. People high in self-focus were more sensitive to the action primes, shown in greater PEP reactivity, but not to the inaction primes. The findings extend the growing literature on how priming influences effort and support models of how self-focused attention shapes motivational processes.
Why people sometimes try hard to reach their goals and other times withhold effort is one of the cardinal problems in the psychology of motivation (Gendolla, Wright, & Richter, 2012) . Of the many situational factors that affect effort, implicit priming is one of the most intriguing. Many recent studies have shown that priming concepts outside of awareness can affect effort.
Most research has proposed that priming affects effort indirectly by affecting factors such as the task's self-relevance, difficulty, or value. For example, priming concepts related to pain and emotions can make tasks seem easier or harder (e.g., Blanchfield, Hardy, & Marcora, 2014; Gendolla, 2015; Silvestrini, 2015) , and priming people's first names can make success more important (Silvia, Jones, Kelly, & Zibaie, 2011; Silvia, Moore, & Nardello, 2014) . Gendolla and Silvestrini (2010) , however, proposed that priming goals related to action versus inaction in general (Albarracin, Hepler, & Tannenbaum, 2011) -via words such as action, fast, and go versus slow, passive, and stop-can directly affect the mobilization of effort. In their study, participants worked on a memory task while being rapidly primed with action primes, inaction primes, or nonword control primes. Effort, measured by change in the cardiac preejection period (PEP) from baseline to task, was highest in the action prime condition and lowest in the inaction prime condition. In later work, Silvestrini and Gendolla (2013) found that action priming increased effort only when success was feasible (i.e., when a task was easy or moderately hard instead of extremely hard) and when effort was worthwhile (i.e., when incentives for success were high). Collectively, these studies show that implicit action and inaction cues can directly influence the intensity of effort for the task at hand and that these effects are moderated by established motivational factors such as task difficulty and incentive value.
If situational factors (e.g., incentives and task difficulty; Silvestrini & Gendolla, 2013) shape the effects of action and inaction priming, what dispositional factors moderate these priming effects? One likely factor is individual differences in self-focused attention, the tendency to reflect inward on the self instead of the external environment (Fenigstein, 2009) . Self-focused attention plays many roles in effort (Silvia, 2014) , one of which is making people more sensitive to implicit primes.
In Hull and Levy's (1979) model, selffocused attention affects action via influencing self-referent encoding. Self-focused attention causes "an increased tendency to encode information as self-relevant" (Hull, Slone, Meteyer, & Matthews, 2002, p. 420) . The information could be explicit information, such as the salient standards, values, and goals that most research on self-focus has emphasized (Duval & Silvia, 2001) . But the information could be subtle, such as implicit cues for action. If self-focus increases "the individual's sensitivity and responsivity to cues according to the cues' relevance for the self," as Hull et al. (2002, p. 407) propose, then self-focused people will code implicit cues as self-relevant and hence as relevant for ongoing action.
Consistent with Hull et al.'s (2002) proposal, several studies have shown that people high in trait self-focused attention-sometimes called self-reflection (Grant, Franklin, & Langford, 2002) or private self-consciousness (Fenigstein, 2009 )-are more strongly affected by implicit priming. For example, people high in trait selffocus were more strongly affected by primes associated with politeness and rudeness (Wheeler, Morrison, DeMarree, & Petty, 2008) and aggression versus peace (DeMarree & Loersch, 2009 ), according to behavioral measures. In a psychophysiological study of effort, people high in trait self-focus were more strongly affected by primes associated with task difficulty, as shown in cardiovascular measures, during a cognitive task (Silvia, Kelly, Zibaie, Nardello, & Moore, 2013) .
In the present research, we thus examined whether individual differences in trait selffocused attention influence sensitivity to implicit action primes. People were randomly assigned to work on a self-paced, unfixed task that contained either implicit action or inaction primes. Effort-related physiological activity was measured via changes in the cardiac PEP, a measure of beta-adrenergic sympathetic influence on the heart (Kelsey, 2012) that is commonly used in effort research (Richter, 2012) . We expected that, overall, action primes would increase effort relative to inaction primes and that individual differences in trait self-focus would moderate the effects. For participants higher in trait self-focus, action primes should increase and inaction primes should decrease effort-related cardiac activity more strongly.
Method

Participants and Design
A total of 76 adults took part in the experiment. Seven were omitted from the analyses because they misunderstood the parity task, reported taking medications that would preclude participation, or did not yield usable physiological signals. These exclusions resulted in a final sample of 69 participants-12 men and 57 women-that ranged in age from 18 -31 years (M ϭ 18.90, SD ϭ 1.86). The sample was diverse-14% Hispanic or Latino, 53% African American, and 44% European Americanbased on self-reported race and ethnicity (people could select more than one option or not select any). All participants were undergraduate students at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro (UNCG), and they received credit toward a voluntary research participation option in a psychology class.
The participants were randomly assigned to one of two between-groups conditions-action primes or inaction primes. There were four experimenters-three women and one man-so each experimenter was assigned a different set of randomized blocks. The use of blocks ensured that each experimenter ran similar proportions of participants in each condition, thus preventing a confounding of experimenter with condition.
Procedure
The research was approved and monitored by the UNCG Institutional Review Board. After providing informed consent, participants learned that the study was about how the body responded during cognitive tasks that required making quick judgments despite distractions. The experimenter, who was the same gender, then placed the electrodes and started a 3-min rest period, in which people simply sat quietly, to allow the physiological signals to stabilize. This was followed by a baseline period, in which participants completed self-report surveys and demographic items on the computer. This period serves as a "plain vanilla" baseline that holds constant several irrelevant factors between the baseline and task (e.g., sitting upright, reading from a monitor, and using a mouse and keyboard). The baseline lasted for approximately 8 min.
Parity task. After the baseline, the participants completed a parity task, which is an unfixed, self-paced task (Wright, Killebrew, & Pimpalapure, 2002 ) that has been used in several recent effort studies (Chatelain & Gendolla, 2015; Harper, Silvia, Eddington, Sperry, & Kwapil, 2017) . In a parity task, people are shown a word flanked by two numbers (e.g., 8 HOUSE 3), and they must ignore the word and indicate if the numbers have the same parity (i.e., both even or both odd) or different parity (i.e., one is even and the other is odd). People could work at their own pace for 3 min. They were told to get as many correct as possible during that time and that they would receive 3 cents, paid in cash, for each correct response at the end of the study.
Apart from being an established task, the parity task lends itself well to implicit priming because of its use of centrally presented words. Each trial started with a fixation cross for 250 ms. Next, a prime word appeared for 27 ms. We used the same prime words used in past research. The action primes were fast, go, action, and run; the inaction primes were slow, stop, sleep, and passive. After the prime, a random letter mask (e.g., NBRGCSVKTD) appeared for 120 ms, followed by the parity item (e.g., 8 SOFA 2, 8 PLANE 5, 3 TOWN 8) . The parity item stayed on screen until the participant gave a response (a yellow key for same parity, a blue key for different parity). The primes appeared for roughly two thirds of the trials; for the rest, random letter strings composed of the letters in the prime words were shown. We primed on 67% instead of 100% of trials because past work has shown that, in some cases, people can habituate to a prime when it is always presented (Silvestrini & Gendolla, 2011) . In addition, our past work on first-name priming has effectively used priming at 67% (e.g., Silvia, 2012; Silvia et al., 2011) . Responses were collected with a high-speed keyboard with a timing accuracy of 1 ms, and the surveys and parity task were administered using MediaLab and DirectRT.
At the end of the experiment, we assessed whether people showed above-chance recognition of the prime words. They were told that during the parity task, sometimes real words were flashed extremely quickly. All participants were shown all eight prime words (four in their condition as well as the other four) along with eight foil words in a random order. For each one, they gave a forced-choice recognition response (Yes, I saw this word or No, I didn't see this word). Participants were told that it was okay to guess and that they should use their intuition and hunches if unsure. We calculated unbiased hit rates (H U ; Wagner, 1993) to estimate each person's accuracy at identifying the prime words.
Measurement of trait self-focused attention. As in our past research, we measured trait self-focus with two scales. The first was the revised private self-conscious scale (Scheier & Carver, 1985) . This scale has nine items (e.g., "I'm always trying to figure myself out") and showed good reliability (␣ ϭ .76). The second was the self-reflection scale (Grant et al., 2002) . This scale has 12 items (e.g., "I am usually aware of my thoughts") and has good reliability (␣ ϭ .89). People completed the items on a 7-point scale (1 ϭ strongly disagree, 7 ϭ strongly agree). The two scales correlated highly with each other (r ϭ .69), so we standardized the overall scores and averaged them to create an overall trait self-focus score. People completed the scales after the parity task as part of a larger set of personality scales but before completing the measure of prime awareness.
Physiological assessment. Cardiac activity was assessed using impedance cardiography methods. For the electrocardiogram (ECG), three electrodes were placed in a modified Lead II configuration (one on each lowest rib and one on the right collarbone). For the impedance cardiogram, two receiving electrodes were placed on the chest (one on the left collarbone at the level of the suprasternal notch and another on the base of the sternum at the xiphoid process), and two sending electrodes were placed on the back at 4 cm above or below the receiving electrodes. The physiological signals were acquired at 1,000 Hz using Mindware Bionex hardware, and they were filtered offline (ECG: .5-45 Hz; dZ/dt: .5-50 Hz; Z 0 : 10-Hz cutoff; 60-Hz notch filter).
Our physiological outcomes were measures of cardiac contractility, which primarily reflects the degree of beta-adrenergic sympathetic activity on the heart. PEP, our primary outcome, was calculated as the time (in ms) between the ECG Q point (depolarization onset; Berntson, Lozano, Chen, & Cacioppo, 2004) and the dz/dt B point (left ventricular ejection onset; Lozano et al., 2007) . PEP is the most widely used measure of effort-related cardiac activity in effort research that uses impedance cardiography methods. As a secondary measure, we computed the RZ interval. Also known as the initial systolic time interval (Meijer, Boesveldt, Elbertse, & Berendse, 2008) , RZ is attracting increasing interest as an additional marker of contractility (e.g., Silvia et al., 2016; van Lien, Schutte, Meijer, & de Geus, 2013) . The RZ interval was calculated as the time (in ms) between the ECG R point (the peak electrical activity point) and the dz/dt Z point (the dz/dt peak and the point of the aortic arch's maximum diameter; van Eijnatten, van Rijssel, Peters, Verdaasdonk, & Meijer, 2014). We created 60-s ensemble averages (Kelsey et al., 1998) for the ECG and dZ/dt waveforms. Q was identified as the lowest point within 35 ms before R (Berntson et al., 2004) , and B was estimated via the Lozano et al. (2007) slope/intercept method (i.e., RB ϭ RZ ϫ .55 ϩ 4). The Mindware IMP 3.1.1 software automatically identified the points, which were corrected manually in only a few cases. Heart rate, expressed as the interbeat interval (IBI; in ms), was calculated as well for the sake of comprehensiveness. No predictions were made for IBI, which, unlike PEP and RZ, is strongly influenced by the parasympathetic nervous system (Berntson, Cacioppo, & Quigley, 1993) .
Results
Data Reduction
To form baseline scores, we used five 60-s segments (the second through sixth baseline minutes for all participants) from the baseline period. PEP, RZ, and IBI values were calculated for each 60-s segment, and the scores were then averaged across the five segments for overall baseline scores. To form task scores, we split the parity task into three 60-s segments; calculated PEP, RZ, and IBI for each segment; and then averaged across the segments for overall task scores. Finally, reactivity scores (change from baseline to task) were created by subtracting baseline scores from the task scores. Note that negative values for the PEP and RZ scores indicate increased contractility from baseline to task, which is consistent with greater effort. Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics.
Regression models were used to estimate the effects of priming and trait self-focus on physiological reactivity. The model included main effects for priming (coded 1 ϭ action, Ϫ1 ϭ inaction) and for trait self-focus (a continuous predictor centered at zero) as well as the interaction between priming and trait self-focus. In addition, the baseline physiological value was included as a predictor to account for possible covariance between the baseline and reactivity score.
Action Priming, Trait Self-Focused Attention, and Effort PEP. For the cardiac PEP, our primary outcome, a regression analysis found no main effect of action versus inaction priming (␤ ϭ .07, p ϭ .561). There was a significant main effect of self-focused attention (␤ ϭ Ϫ.30, p ϭ .014). People higher in self-focused attention had more negative PEP values, indicating greater effort overall. Finally, there was a significant interaction between self-focused attention and priming (␤ ϭ Ϫ.26, p ϭ .024). The baseline PEP values marginally predicted PEP reactivity (␤ ϭ .21, p ϭ .076). Figure 1 displays the interaction pattern. Overall, people higher in trait self-focus responded much more strongly to the action primes but not to the inaction primes. In the inaction priming condition, the correlation between trait self-focus and PEP reactivity was essentially zero, r(33) ϭ .02, p ϭ .913. In the action priming condition, however, trait selffocus attention had a large and significant correlation with PEP reactivity, r(36) ϭ Ϫ.47, p ϭ .004. People high in self-focused attention were thus more sensitive to the action primes but were not apparently affected by the inaction primes.
RZ. For the RZ interval, a secondary measure of contractility, the pattern of results was Note. n ϭ 33 inaction priming condition; n ϭ 36 action priming condition. PEP ϭ preejection period; IBI ϭ interbeat interval. essentially identical. A regression model found no main effect of the action versus inaction priming (␤ ϭ .09, p ϭ .429), but there was a significant main effect of trait self-focus (␤ ϭ Ϫ.33, p ϭ .006): People higher in trait selffocus tried harder overall. Finally, there was a significant interaction between priming and trait self-focus (␤ ϭ Ϫ.26, p ϭ .022). The baseline values predicted RZ reactivity as well (␤ ϭ Ϫ.26, p ϭ .026).
The interaction pattern for RZ reactivity was essentially the same as it was for PEP reactivity. In the inaction priming condition, trait selffocus was uncorrelated with RZ change, r(33) ϭ .01, p ϭ .960. In the action priming condition, however, trait self-focus significantly correlated with RZ change, r(36) ϭ Ϫ.50, p ϭ .002, indicating that people high in trait selffocus were more strongly affected by the action primes.
IBI. For IBI reactivity, there were no significant main effects for priming (␤ ϭ .16, p ϭ .198) or for trait self-focus (␤ ϭ .00, p ϭ .999), and the interaction was not significant as well (␤ ϭ .00, p ϭ .988). The baseline values marginally predicted IBI reactivity (␤ ϭ Ϫ.22 p ϭ .074).
2
Behavioral Performance
Did priming and trait self-focus predict how well people did on the parity task? Our primary outcome was the number of correct responses, given that participants were instructed to get as many correct as possible and were rewarded for each correct response. On average, people completed 92.71 correct trials correct in 3 min (SD ϭ 11.87). A regression analysis indicated that there were no main effects of priming (␤ ϭ Ϫ.05, p ϭ .674) or trait self-focus (␤ ϭ .01, p ϭ .922) and no interaction between them (␤ ϭ Ϫ.16, p ϭ .204). The secondary measure was response time for correct trials (in ms). The average response time was 1,105.46 ms (SD ϭ 252.86). As before, there were no main effects for priming (␤ ϭ Ϫ.03, p ϭ .790) or trait self-focus (␤ ϭ Ϫ.01, p ϭ .919) and no interaction between them (␤ ϭ .11, p ϭ .371.) In short, the greater effort that people high in trait self-focus showed in response to action primes did not translate into better performance on the task.
3
Prime Recognition
For the prime recognition task, the unbiased hit rates showed very low recognition accuracy overall, H U ϭ .15, SD ϭ .11, which is consistent with past work (i.e., a simple hit rate of 16.6%; Gendolla & Silvestrini, 2010) . A regression model found no main effect of priming condition (␤ ϭ .19, p ϭ .128) , no main effect of trait self-focus (␤ ϭ .19, p ϭ .126) , and no interaction between them (␤ ϭ Ϫ.05, p ϭ .706). Including unbiased hit rate scores as a covariate also did not change the effects of priming and trait self-focus on PEP and RZ reactivity. The pattern of results for effort-related cardiac activity thus cannot be accounted for by possible differences in the (very low) level of prime recognition accuracy.
Discussion
Most implicit primes-such as emotional faces or words related to pain, task difficulty, or one's own name-shape effort indirectly by influencing factors such as appraisals of a task's difficulty or significance (Gendolla, 2015; Silvestrini, 2015; Silvia et al., 2011 Silvia et al., , 2014 . Action priming, in contrast, is thought to directly promote effort provided that the goal is attainable and worthwhile (Gendolla & Silvestrini, 2010; Silvestrini & Gendolla, 2013) . The present research extended the growing literature on action priming by exploring individual differences related to prime sensitivity. Many studies have shown that people high in trait self-focus are more strongly affected by implicit primes (Sil-2 Cook's D was used to identify potentially influential cases in the regression models for PEP, RZ, and IBI. For all models, however, the average Cook's D was very low (.021, .02, and .017), and the highest values (.149, .164, and .338) were far below the common cutoff of 1 (Stevens, 1984) , so no cases appeared especially influential.
3 A technical issue with self-paced tasks is that participants who work faster engage in more motor behavior and are exposed to more primes. It is unlikely that the number of trials people completed played a role in the observed effects. Neither the number of correct responses nor response times correlated with priming condition, trait self-focus, or the PEP, RZ, and IBI reactivity scores. All correlations ranged from r ϭ Ϫ.07 to r ϭ .05, ns. In addition, the significant interactions between trait self-focus and priming condition for PEP and RZ remained significant and changed only trivially when correct responses and response times were included as covariates. via, 2014; Silvia et al., 2013) because they see the prime as more self-relevant (Hull et al., 2002) .
In the present study, trait self-focus significantly predicted effort, measured as PEP and RZ reactivity, when people were implicitly primed with action concepts during the task. As expected, people high in self-focus exerted significantly greater effort when primed with words related to action goals. This finding supports past work on the effects of action primes on effort and on how self-focus amplifies the effects of priming. When people were primed with inaction primes, however, trait self-focus did not predict more or less effort, so the effects appear to be restricted to the action primes. People's ability to accurately recognize the prime words was very low, and controlling for the minimal variability in prime recognition did not affect the pattern of results, so the effects offer strong support for the finding that selffocus increases effort in response to action primes. No significant effects appeared for behavioral measures of performance, so the greater effort did not translate into higher task performance, a common finding in effort research (e.g., Harper et al., 2016 Harper et al., , 2017 .
Two unexpected aspects of the research are worth considering. First, the present study did not find an overall main effect of action versus inaction priming, as in past studies (Gendolla & Silvestrini, 2010; Silvestrini & Gendolla, 2013) . Second, trait self-focus interacted only with the action primes, not the inaction primes. The present sample and methods varied in many ways from past work, including the kind of cognitive task, the percentage of primed trials, prime duration, and the culture and language of the participants. We suspect, however, that the most important difference is our use of piece-rate incentives. Unlike past work, the present study offered all participants a small amount of cash for each correct answer. This increases the overall significance of doing well on the task and likely explains both divergences. The presence of salient monetary incentives may have obscured a subtle main effect of implicit priming, and it may also have served as a counterweight to the inaction primes in particular. Inaction primes prompt people to slow down, whereas the incentives justify greater effort. This competition may have obscured an overall effect of priming as well as an interaction for inaction primes. This reasoning is speculative, of course, so it would be worth manipulating incentives and primes independently in future research.
In addition, future research should take a broader look at task features that might shift how self-focus and action priming affect effort. For example, some effort research suggests that people can become habituated to implicit primes (Silvestrini & Gendolla, 2011) . We primed most but not all of the task's trials to avoid habituation, but it would be worth varying prime frequency to see just how sensitive people high in self-focus might be to implicit primes. It is not yet known, for example, if trait self-focus makes people more or less likely to habituate to implicit primes, and theories of how priming affect self-processes have not considered the issue (Wheeler, DeMarree, & Petty, 2007) .
